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Mexico and Expropriation: The Case of the
German-American Coffee Company

Angela Winters

Introduction
There are many books that have dealt with agrarian issues in
Mexico in general terms, five of which I have used for this paper.
However, we lack knowledge of the practice of these critical issues,
even to this day, and how they were enacted differed from state to
state.
The discovery of this source base in the U.S. State Department
archives offers a first remarkable look at the state of Chiapas. I
located fifty previously unseen records from Record Group 59 for this
paper. Their critical analysis reveals a complex reality at the border of
Mexico and Guatemala.
One book by Thomas Benjamin, A Rich Land, A Poor People:
Politics and Society in Modern Chiapas, promised insights into
agrarian reforms, but it did not deal with the region where coffee was
grown.
During the 1880s and 1890s, Porfirio Díaz allowed numerous
foreign companies to set up plantations and businesses in Mexico,
namely German entrepreneurs who successfully cultivated the coffee
beans and the plantations and marketed the coffee in Soconosco,
selling it to North America and Europe.1 United States capital began
1

Thomas Benjamin and William McNellie, Other Mexicos: Essays on
Regional Mexican History 1876-1911 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico
Press, 1984), 133.
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pouring into Chiapas between 1900 and 1910, and eventually the
value of the capital began surpassing the value of the German capital
in all of Chiapas.2 By the 1920s, American-owned land in Mexico
was valued at around $140 million.3 One of the companies included in
that value was the German-American Coffee Company, which owned
four different tracts of land throughout Chiapas.
In 1910, agrarian reforms were put into place to prevent foreign
companies from taking the lands belonging to the local people. Once
in office, President Lázaro Cárdenas launched his Six-Year Plan,
which promised to distribute lands to everyone until the needs of all
the rural populations had been met.4 He propelled forward land
reform policies and accelerated studies of land petitions that had
already begun. In fact, he quadrupled the amount of land that the
government redistributed.5 This caused foreign companies, like the
German-American Coffee Company, to lose land when the Mexican
government decided to seize it. The United States and Mexico’s
attempt to settle the agrarian matters facing the coffee company
would seem like a matter of diplomacy. Instead, it became a showcase
of how a company as unimportant as the coffee company could get
caught in the implementation of a revolutionary new law that was
foreign to them, and the professional hesitancy and disregard by the
United States government, who was supposed to be representing
them.

2

Thomas Benjamin, A Rich Land, A Poor People: Politics and Society in
Modern Chiapas (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1989), 83.
3
John J. Dwyer, The Agrarian Dispute (Durham, NC: Duke University Press,
2008), 23.
4
Dana Markiewicz, The Mexican Revolution and the Limits of the Agrarian
Reform, 1915-1946 (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1993), 86.
5
Ann L. Craig, The First Agraristas (Los Angeles: University of California
Press, 1989), 123.
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Agrarian Reform Changes the Business Environment
There are three types of land-grants that the Mexican government
offered and that people sought: restitution, expansion, or dotation.6
Restitution grants were rarely given out, because they required some
type of proof of Spanish royal land grants given to Indian
communities.7 The second type of grant was that of expansion. That
grant was given to communities who already had an ejido8 in their
community but did not have a sufficient amount of land for all of the
eligible ejidatarios9 to work. The final type of grant was the dotation
grant. A majority of the ejidos received this grant.10 The government
gave it out to communities that were not eligible for the restitution
grant, but then in later years, it was granted “to communities of
landless agricultural laborers with no history of communal
landownership.”11
The German-American Coffee Company experienced the
problems of the dotation grant. The main office was located in
Omaha, Nebraska, in the United States,12 but the company itself was
physically located in Triunfo, Salto de Agua, in Chiapas, Mexico, in
the district of Palenque.13 In most correspondences, the property was
referred to as simply “Triunfo” or “El Triunfo.” The plantation was

6

Craig, The First Agraristas, 249.
Ibid., 249-250.
8
An ejido is an area of communal land holding that is used for agriculture,
where each community member farms on a small parcel of land.
9
These are people who do not actually own the land they cultivate. They are
allowed to use it indefinitely, and they can even pass that allowance on to their
children.
10
Craig, The First Agraristas, 250.
11
Ibid.
12
NAUS, RG 59, M1370, Internal Affairs of Mexico 1930-1939, Reel #103,
812.500-German-American Coffee Company/1 (hereafter cited as M1370/103,
812.500-German-American Coffee Company/1).
13
Ibid.
7
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managed by a William (Guillermo, Wilhelm) Fahrholz14, who lived
on the plantation and oversaw the various duties.15 The Mexican
government had taken plantations that were similar in size to the
German-American Coffee Company, but until then, it had left that
company alone.16 Once the Mexican government seized the property,
Fahrholz gained the help and support of the US Embassy.
The German-American Coffee Company was incorporated in
1903, before the dispute arose between the Mexican government and
the company. This newly incorporated company was the second most
important North American capital investment in Chiapas.17 Like most
other plantations in Chiapas, it was owned solely by American
investors. The only one who owned shares in the company who was
not American was Fahrholz, who was a German national.18 Because
of the name of the company, in the beginning, both governments
doubted that it was an American company. When Jaime Torres Bodet,
the future Secretary of Public Education in Mexico, inquired about its
nationality, he was informed “… that the name probably had its origin
in the fact that some of the organizers were persons of German origin
. . . and that practically all of the owners . . . were American
citizens.”19 It is clear that the United States government wanted to
make sure that this was truly an American company before they got
involved with it. Once the company’s vice-president produced
evidence of the one hundred seventy bondholders, their residency, and
the amount of money they had invested,20 the government agreed to
help them out.
14

Unfortunately, the only other information on William Fahrholz is a lawsuit
from 1950. All other traces of him remain elusive.
15
M1370/103, 812.500-German-American Coffee Company/1.
16
Ibid.
17
Benjamin, A Rich Land, A Poor People, 83.
18
M1370/103, 812.500-German-American Coffee Company/1.
19
M1370/103, 812.500-German-American Coffee Company/9.
20
M1370/103, 812.500-German-American Coffee Company/1.
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One person who had a vested interest in the case of the GermanAmerican Coffee Company was Karl Stefan21, a Congressman from
Nebraska, where the main office was located. Many of the people
who invested in the company lived in the district that he represented,
so it only stands to reason that he would be willing to help protect
their investments, especially if he wanted to get reelected.22
He also received the information about the stock and bondholders
and he submitted the proposition as one that involved the property
interests of citizens of the United States.23 Stefan insisted in his letters
to various people that Fahrholz was doing his best to protect the
interests of US citizens.24 As a result, Sumner Welles, the Deputy
Secretary of State, told Stefan that he would instruct the American
Embassy to help the company in any way possible on behalf of the
American citizens who held stocks and bonds in the company.25
However, the Embassy wrote that Fahrholz informed them that he
would not seek the help of the American government except as a last
resort.26
The Government Offers Its Help
Eventually, Fahrholz decided he needed help from higher
authorities. He began calling the Embassy on a regular basis about his
problems. They were prepared to help him, as Welles had asked them
to be. He asked them numerous questions about ways to resolve his
21

Karl Stefan moved to Omaha, Nebraska, with his parents in 1885, from what
is now the Czech Republic. He moved to Norfolk, Nebraska, in 1909 to be a
telegrapher. He was first elected to Congress in 1934, and remained in office until
his death in 1951 (“Karl Stefan.” Wikipedia. 29 November 2013.
www.wikipedia.org).
22
M1370/103, 812.500-German-American Coffee Company/1.
23
M1370/103, 812.500-German-American Coffee Company/4.
24
M1370/103, 812.500-German-American Coffee Company/5.
25
M1370/103, 812.500-German-American Coffee Company/4.
26
M1370/103, 812.500-German-American Coffee Company/1.
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case. He continued to try to get an appointment with President
Cárdenas, insisting that if he could just explain his predicament, the
president would agree with him and put a stop to all expropriations on
the El Triunfo land.27 On June 4, 1937, Fahrholz met with Pierre de L.
Boal, an undersecretary to Josephus Daniels, to discuss with him
some thoughts on how to solve everything.28 One of his ideas was in
regards to the Bucareli Treaties and if there were any possible
provisions in them that might be able to provide any type of
assistance.29
The treaties derive their name from the location in which they
took place in 1923 between Mexico and the United States: Bucareli
Street in Mexico City.30 Representatives from both countries drafted
two claims agreements: the “Special Claims Convention” and a
“General Claims Convention.”31 The treaties assured that American
lands would remain intact and untouched in exchange for support of
Obregón’s government, which quickly improved relations between
the two countries.32 The two conventions were signed at different
times: the General Claims Convention was signed in Washington,
D.C., in September of 1923, and became effective in March of 1924.33
The Special Claims Convention was signed in Mexico City, in
September of 1923, and went into effect in February of 1924.34 The
treaties were short-lived, however, because once Calles came into
power, he began expropriating American-owned property, and refused
to give it back, saying that they would not change their agrarian

27

M1370/103, 812.500-German-American Coffee Company/5.
M1370/103, 812.500-German-American Coffee Company/6.
29
Ibid.
30
M1370/103, 812.500-German-American Coffee Company/8.
31
Ibid.
32
Dwyer, The Agrarian Dispute, 37-38.
33
M1370/103, 812.500-German-American Coffee Company/8.
34
Ibid.
28

242

Angela Winters
policy.35 Therefore, there were no provisions that could help Fahrholz
in his time of need.
Not to be deterred, Fahrholz continued with his questions. He
wanted to know if it was it possible to have a presentation of a
diplomatic claim on behalf of the company. Unfortunately, that was
not possible, either, because claims for expropriations occurring after
1934 “could not be dealt with by any existing claims commission.”36
Boal did tell him that he could ask the Department of the Embassy if a
diplomatic claim could be provided for now or at some point in the
future, but that it might be extremely difficult to accomplish a lot for
the company.37 Author Ann L. Craig writes that in practice, the
government rarely reimbursed owners for expropriating the land, but
when they did, it was mainly to foreign landowners and not to the
natives.38
The company hired a legal firm in Nebraska to help with their
case, hoping it would speed things along. The main attorney from the
firm, Charles E. Abbott, had had an interest in the company for over
twenty years.39 Sources do not give a reason for his interest. Fahrholz
wrote to Abbott, telling him that they needed to get their
expropriation case through to the American Embassy quickly.
Someone from the State Department had arrived at El Triunfo with
the intention of turning the Triunfo land over to the Indians.40
“This is just what I intended to avoid by seeing the President in
time, whereof unfortunately I did not get a chance,” Fahrholz wrote in
his letter to Abbott,41 in regards to his attempts to get a meeting with
President Cárdenas.
35

Dwyer, The Agrarian Dispute, 38.
M1370/103, 812.500-German-American Coffee Company/6.
37
Ibid.
38
Craig, The First Agraristas, 129.
39
M1370/103, 812.500-German-American Coffee Company/17.
40
M1370/103, 812.500-German-American Coffee Company/1.
41
M1370/103, 812.500-German-American Coffee Company/3.
36
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In response, Abbott sent a letter to Stefan, requesting that the
American State Department ask the Mexican government to stop all
of the activities that were being used to take away the El Triunfo land
until the property had been fully considered.42 Abbott pointed out to
Stefan that the company was a working business, and that if it was
hindered in any way, the losses would be considerably large,43
especially since El Triunfo was the main coffee plant.
The other lawyer they hired, Harvey A. Basham, formally
represented the company and was a prominent American lawyer who
had set up his practice in Mexico City and had good ties to the
American Embassy.44 When Fahrholz consulted with Basham, the
lawyer told him that he had had other similar cases as the coffee
company’s taken up with the Embassy, but he’d had no positive
results.45
At one point, Fahrholz informed Boal that a “coyote”46 had
approached him and said he knew all about the case of the GermanAmerican Coffee Company. The coyote attempted to bribe Fahrholz,
saying that he would take care of things for 15,000 pesos.47 Even
though Fahrholz said he declined the offer, it is not surprising that an
attempt at bribery was made. John Mason Hart (as cited in John J.
Dwyer’s book The Agrarian Dispute) said, “Fraud and corruption
were inherent in the process.”48 He was informed by Boal that the
Embassy could not have any part in anything illegal, whether directly
or indirectly. Fahrholz reassured him that he just wanted the offer to

42

M1370/103, 812.500-German-American Coffee Company/1.
M1370/103, 812.500-German-American Coffee Company/6.
44
M1370/103, 812.500-German-American Coffee Company/17.
45
M1370/103, 812.500-German-American Coffee Company/4.
46
A “coyote” is a term that generally refers to one who smuggles immigrants
into the United States.
47
M1370/103, 812.500-German-American Coffee Company/6.
48
Dwyer, The Agrarian Dispute, 23.
43
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be on record as having been suggested.49 It is hard to know if
Fahrholz made that arrangement with the coyote in the beginning, but
then backed out at the last minute and reported it to the Embassy to
cover his own tracks.
Fahrholz continued to insist on seeing President Cárdenas. In a
letter to Joel M. Roberts, the vice president of the German-American
Coffee Company, Fahrholz wrote, “When staying in El Triunfo on his
propaganda trip in 1934, he [Cárdenas] voluntarily offered me to call
on him on any matter and at any time, as he would gladly attend
me.”50 Taking possible deception into account in the entire process, it
is not hard to believe that Cárdenas’s words to Fahrholz were nothing
but empty promises. Fahrholz was convinced that the expropriation of
land from the El Triunfo plantation was a made-up job by lesser
authorities.51 In his letter to Roberts, he writes, “It seems just like
being done intentionally to raise trouble where none are.”52
In his quest to help Fahrholz obtain a meeting with Cárdenas,
Stefan petitioned to the Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, to see if the
United States Ambassador to Mexico, Josephus Daniels, would be
willing to make an exception in requesting an appointment between
Cárdenas and Fahrholz, but the ambassador was not willing to make
any exceptions.53
Daniels felt sympathy for the peasantry of Mexico. He and
President Roosevelt of the United States both felt that land
redistribution was a great way to help the poor.54 This sympathy
towards the people of Mexico really allowed the Mexican government
to string the US government along, because Cárdenas kept telling
Roosevelt what he wanted to hear: that the American people were
49

M1370/103, 812.500-German-American Coffee Company/6.
M1370/103, 812.500-German-American Coffee Company/4.
51
Ibid.
52
Ibid.
53
M1370/103, 812.500-German-American Coffee Company/5.
54
Dwyer, The Agrarian Dispute, 165.
50
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going to be paid for their land. Mexico never followed through with
the promise, though.
Finally, Stefan wrote to Hull, telling him that the situation with
the company seemed to be getting worse. The people representing the
company were beginning to feel that the officials at the Embassy were
not doing anything to help them.55 In a way, the company was correct.
The officials did not really want to get involved in the whole process.
President Roosevelt had other things to worry about, such as the
United States emerging out of the Great Depression, and the threat of
World War II. The last thing Roosevelt and others in his
administration probably wanted to deal with was something as small
as agrarian matters. As it turned out, the US government stated that it
was their understanding that the delay was because of Fahrholz’s
attempts to see Cárdenas.56 Once they cleared that issue up, Boal
immediately sent off a letter to General Eduardo Hay, the Minister of
Foreign Affairs in Mexico.
In his letter, he requested that the issues of the German-American
Coffee Company be investigated, and if the company was in danger
of losing everything, then a new resolution be written so that the
company would be allowed to remain in operation and not lose all of
its investments.57
In an effort to remind Hay of the other reasons for his letter, he
outlined a few of the facts as he understood them in regards to the
coffee company. He stated that the ejidos of Tumbala, San Felipe58,
and other areas that existed when the company purchased lands
already had more than enough land than they needed or could
completely cultivate.59 He also understood that a census had been
55

M1370/103, 812.500-German-American Coffee Company/7.
M1370/103, 812.500-German-American Coffee Company/8.
57
M1370/103, 812.500-German-American Coffee Company/9.
58
San Felipe is a part of Tumbala.
59
M1370/103, 812.500-German-American Coffee Company/9.
56
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taken after a new petition for lands had been made by the village of
Tumbala. The census stated that there were 277 individuals, which
included heads of households and families, and that all of these
people were entitled to land.60 However, wrote Boal, “it is reliably
reported that at the place there have never existed even one-fifth as
many persons entitled to lands.”61 He felt that the census of Tumbala
was inflated by bringing in people from the other surrounding areas.62
Author Ann L. Craig has pointed out that there were ways to
misrepresent the amount of people that needed land.63 Some ways to
do this included forging signatures, listing non-residents of a
community, and having laborers and craftsmen apply on the petition
instead of just campesinos.64 In order to be considered for a land
grant, a community had to have at least twenty signatures. Craig
points out that the same number of individuals on the petition would
also be judged to determine if they were eligible to receive land when
the government took census of the area.65
Reports Create Frustration and Suspicion
In August of 1937, the Foreign Office of Mexico sent a report
from the Agrarian Department in the Mexican government stating
their findings on the issues with the German-American Coffee
Company. When Boal forwarded the report to Hull, he mentioned that
Fahrholz was shown the report and he said that it was an inadequate
refutation of the company’s case, and that he planned to prepare
counter-arguments.66

60

Ibid.
Ibid.
62
Ibid.
63
Craig, The First Agraristas, 96.
64
Ibid.
65
Ibid.
66
M1370/103, 812.500-German-American Coffee Company/11.
61
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The Foreign Office of Mexico stated in their findings that the
agrarian census that showed the 277 individuals included areas around
Tumbala, because they were politically and economically dependent
upon the area requesting dotation of the lands expropriated.67 In
response to the claim that the ejidos had more than enough land, the
report points out that it was necessary to grant those people land,
because they, in fact, did not have sufficient land. Each area around
Tumbala had a share in 1,454 hectares of pastureland with fifty
percent workable communal land. The tillable land was enough for
ninety parcels, so that each person was granted eight hectares.68 Thus,
it was deemed that the area did not have enough land for those who
lived there.
Of course, Fahrholz did not agree with the findings of the
Mexican Agrarian Department, and insisted to Karl Stefan that it did
not state the facts correctly or truthfully, nor did it offer any type of
settlement or remedy for the situation.69 Stefan suggested to Hull that
maybe the company could submit a claim to the General Claims
Commission for the US and Mexico. Unfortunately, by that time, it
was too late to submit any claim. Under the existing treaty between
the two countries, the jurisdiction of the General Claims Commission
only extended to claims that had arisen between July 4, 1868, and
August 30, 1927.70 There was not even a way to lengthen or broaden
the jurisdiction of the Commission, since there was a provision in the
General Claims Convention that did not allow the Commission any
jurisdiction to claims after 1927.71
In addition to that, the German-American Coffee Company was
denied any opportunity to amparo proceedings. Amparo means
67

Ibid.
Ibid.
69
M1370/103, 812.500-German-American Coffee Company/12.
70
Ibid.
71
Ibid.
68
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“protection” in Spanish, and refers to the protection of human rights,
or a constitutional protection lawsuit.72 Article 10 of the Agrarian
Law of January 6, 1915, reads, “Land owners affected by resolutions
heretofore or hereafter issued for the purpose of endowing towns
with, or restoring to them, “ejidos” or waters shall not have the right
or ordinary legal remedy or the special remedy of amparo.”73
Transitory Article 2 of Article 10 also states that “all amparo suits
pending decision either before district courts or on appeal . . . shall be
forthwith dismissed.”74
As a result, Harvey A. Basham, lawyer to the company in Mexico
City, advised the company that even if they had begun amparo
proceedings, they would have been for naught, since the Agrarian
Law clearly stated that the suit would have been dismissed by the
government.75 He also told them that in his opinion, as long as
Cárdenas was to remain president, there would be no modification of
any importance that would be beneficial to the plantation owners.76
In a sit-down conference between Basham, Fahrholz, Abbot, and
two other men, of whom sources do not speak except for this source,
Basham said that El Triunfo would have to cease operations because
of the way the properties were divided up.77 According to Mexican
officials, the Mexican government also had no intention of paying any
just compensation to Americans whose property they had confiscated.
Basham felt that their attitude toward the entire ordeal was pretty
cavalier, that since the Mexican government saw America as a great

72

Norma Gutierrez, “Mexico: New Amparo Law is Enacted,” Global Legal
Monitor, Apr. 30, 2013, http://www.loc.gov/lawweb/servlet/lloc_news?disp3_
l205403575_text.
73
M1370/103, 812.500-German-American Coffee Company/16.
74
Ibid.
75
Ibid.
76
Ibid.
77
M1370/103, 812.500-German-American Coffee Company/17.
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and wealthy nation, they would not press for any type of
compensation.78
Despite that, Basham submitted a proposal to the others in the
conference. The proposal included payment, in cash, to American
citizens with money invested in the company on the taxable value of
the land that had been expropriated, plus ten percent.79 He was of the
opinion that the Mexican government would consider the proposal if
they submitted it properly and, should it actually have a fair chance at
being accepted, it could be a formal agreement between the United
States and Mexico.80
At first, the proposal was doubted by many, but in Josephus
Daniels’ view, the plan had some merit, especially since Harvey
Basham had come up with it. Basham had considerable prominence in
the Mexican community, was familiar with Mexico and its dealings,
and had a lot of experience in Mexico. In view of those qualities,
Daniels thought it was something to be considered by the Embassy.81
Had anyone else suggested the idea, he would have been dismissed
and the idea thought of as absurd.
The idea was raised with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and also
to President Cárdenas himself, but when questioned by the American
Embassy as to the progress of the idea, Daniels was always told that
the Mexican government was studying ways of how to pay for the
lands.82 This was one way in which the Mexican government
managed to string the US along. Cárdenas and his cabinet members
would drag an issue out as long as they possibly could, by evading
questions and giving vague answers. Finally the Embassy was told
that the best person to answer the question was the Minister of the
78

Ibid.
Ibid.
80
Ibid.
81
M1370/103, 812.500-German-American Coffee Company/18.
82
Ibid.
79
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Hacienda, Eduardo Suarez. It was said that he knew more about his
country’s financial position and whether or not Mexico could afford
to make payments to the citizens whose lands had been taken away.83
The Agrarian Code of Mexico stated that the landowner whose
land was expropriated could apply for compensation, provided that he
did it within one year of the publication of the presidential resolution
in the Diario Oficial.84 The presidential resolution is a decree signed
by Cárdenas to give the land to the ejidos. Once it is published in the
Diario Oficial85, the rest of the land distribution can be carried out.
Fahrholz applied for that compensation within the time frame;
however, when he filled out the paperwork sent to him by the
American Consul, he wrote down the wrong date of the publication of
the presidential resolution. The consul brought it to his attention,
suggesting that he get his facts right before filling out the new
paperwork they were sending him.86 Since he wrote down the wrong
dates, it is difficult to be clear if he actually got his application in on
time. It would seem that he did, because none of the evidence
indicates otherwise. Fahrholz also happened to write down the wrong
number of hectares contained in his properties of Machuyil and
Revancha, prompting the consul to inform him that his numbers did
not match up with the numbers of the Agrarian Department.87 It
appears that later in 1938, Fahrholz’s numbers again do not match up,
this time with the amount of hectares taken by the Tax Collector in
Salto de Agua. The Consul states that it is possible that they made a
mistake, but after seeing all of the mistakes that Fahrholz had made
thus far, it is unlikely.88
83

Ibid.
Craig, The First Agraristas, 252.
85
The Diario Oficial is the official main publication of the Mexican
government that is published daily.
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M1370/103, 812.500-German-American Coffee Company/20.
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Ibid.
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The Agrarian Department sent their report to the American
consul to refute Fahrholz’s arguments. The report addresses all four of
Fahrholz’s main arguments, including the one regarding census
inflation. It states that a census was first taken in 1926 and the Local
Agrarian Commission announced the results in public, so that any
parties interested could present objections within thirty days, and the
German-American Coffee Company made no such objections.89
Despite no arguments or objections, the Agrarian Department took
another census in 1936, along with a representative of the company,
Juan Tello, and he agreed with the department that, indeed, there
existed 284 people who were eligible to receive lands, even though
the department only gave land to 272 of those people. Tello even
signed the census saying that he agreed with the numbers.90
The department also pointed out that in October of 1936, the
German-American Coffee Company told the Agrarian Delegation that
they had never, and would never, interfere with the carrying out of
any agrarian laws. All the company was asking, according to the
report, was for a change in the ejidal lands.91 The company told the
delegation that it owned better land on its other properties and that the
land on the El Triunfo plantation was not as good as the other
properties. They said that El Triunfo was rocky and uneven.92 Their
argument was that the delegation should take land from the other
properties and give it to the people, since it was much better, and let
the company keep El Triunfo, because that land was not as good.93
It is interesting to note, as does the Mexican Agrarian
Department in their report, that if the Triunfo land was as bad as the
company claimed, it would be beneficial to the company to get rid of
89

M1370/103, 812.500-German-American Coffee Company/19.
Ibid.
91
Ibid.
92
Ibid.
93
Ibid.
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it.94 However, it makes one wonder whether the Triunfo land was as
bad as they said. The plantation owners said it was uneven and rocky.
Yet, if that were the case, why did they make Triunfo their main
coffee plant? If the other properties had better land, why did they not
make one of those properties the main plant? It seems as if the
German-American Coffee Company did not want to give up Triunfo.
In a letter to the company’s vice-president, Fahrholz wrote, “If the
Government wants to harm us any way, I mean take some more land
from us, let them take from our Chuctiepa land, but not from
Triunfo!”95 It stands to reason that they would want to keep Triunfo,
since it covered about 43,000 acres and employed about 3,000
Indians.96 Looking at all of the evidence, it appears that the company
was employing some type of deception to keep what they deemed to
be the best land.
As if to remind Fahrholz of the amount of land the Mexican
government took from them, the American consul sent several letters
to Fahrholz, urging him to keep the consulate informed of any other
properties that might be mentioned in presidential resolutions that
might possibly have American investors.97 He was also reminded
several times by the office of the Secretary of State to carefully
observe all of Mexico’s laws and to document and keep all evidence
available in case they could possibly file any future claims.98
In response to the Secretary of State, Abbott told him that since
his clients did not have any rights under Mexico’s agrarian laws, what
were they to do? He also mentioned that the German-American
Coffee Company had been a working plantation, and since the seizure
of its lands, its value had pretty much diminished due to lack of care
94
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and neglect.99 Eventually, conditions became so bad for the company
that it was extremely difficult for them to meet basic expenses and
other obligations.100
The Final Ultimatum
The American government finally told Mexico that the American
citizens whose land had been taken away from them, needed to be
paid compensation.101 Mexico replied that they would make the
arrangements, but that they needed to discuss the manner of
payment.102 In Boal’s opinion (as cited in John J. Dwyer’s book, The
Agrarian Dispute), “The possibilities of immediate cash
compensation are so remote as to be negligible.”103 It is clear that this
was simply another attempt by the Mexican government to stall in the
negotiations for any type of payment to American citizens.
Shortly thereafter, Fahrholz received a letter from the American
consul regarding all of the German-American Coffee Company’s
properties that had been affected by the Agrarian Laws. The consul
pointed out that Fahrholz’s numbers, once again, conflicted with a
presidential resolution regarding El Triunfo.104 The consul requested a
copy of the source where Fahrholz had gotten his numbers, which he
sent to them. He told the consul that it would probably be best to not
bring the Mexican government’s attention to their mistakes in areas,
and “avoid therefore more difficulties.”105 One has to wonder if the
copy that Fahrholz had was, indeed, the original resolution, especially
after all of his previous mistakes.
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Finally, in November of 1938, Fahrholz received a letter stating
that the two governments had come to an agreement regarding
appraisals of affectations of land and an annual payment that was of a
satisfactory amount to liquidate them over a number of years.106 The
letter encouraged him to begin filling out paperwork for his claim as
soon as possible, so that the company could submit the claim to the
Commission right away.107 The agreement would enable agrarian
claims that had arisen since August 30, 1927, to get a settlement.108 A
second letter he received gave the deadline for submitting all claims
as March 1, 1939.109 The day that Fahrholz received that letter gave
him two months to get all of his evidence and mailings together to
send to the American Consulate.
At some point between January and May of 1939, the two
governments extended the submission deadline to May 31, 1939, and
then the Secretary of State announced in the end of April that they had
agreed to extend the deadline until July 31, 1939.110 It was stated that
the Mexican government agreed to pay one million dollars as a first
payment and that they would have to make the payment to the United
States on or before May 31, 1939, and the US government would
distribute the payments to those whom the money belonged to.111
It seemed that the German-American Coffee Company had some
difficulties getting their paperwork in order, because Abbott asked
Green H. Hackworth, a legal advisor in the office of the Secretary of
State, on July 6, 1939, wanting to know if there was any possibility
that the deadline might get extended out further.112 Unfortunately for
them, Hackworth told them that there was no extended time, nor
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would there be any extended time anywhere in the future.113 Finally,
on July 22, the company sent off their paperwork, where it was filed
on July 28, 1939.114 One would think that the company would have
had their paperwork in sooner, since they had gone to all the trouble
to gather up evidence since 1937. However, they reported having
some difficulties preparing their papers due to the bad conditions on
the plantation, so this may explain the situation.115
Conclusion: Property Expropriation Comparison in Latin
American Countries
After several years of diplomatic foot-dragging, the US and
Mexico finally reached a settlement, called the 1941 Convention
between the United States and Mexico. It provided indemnification to
those landowners whose land had been expropriated. The Mexican
government ended up paying out $40 million for both agrarian and
general claims.116 Whether the German-American Coffee Company
saw any of that money is not known, for there are no other sources
indicating any compensation or solutions for the agrarian problems.
They are just one example of many during the years when Cárdenas
began carrying out his agrarian reforms. Not only did large American
companies have their land taken away, but so did the average
American citizen who had gone to Mexico to farm.
As it would seem, expropriation of property is not unique to
Mexico. US property owners in Cuba and Chile experienced
expropriation, as well. In Mexico, the value of all the property taken
was $300 million. In Cuba and Chile, it was $1.8 billion and between
$747 and $833 million, respectively.117 Even though international law
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stated that any properties expropriated needed to be given prompt
payment, both Chile and Cuba ignored it. Similarly to Mexico’s
amparo proceedings, the governments refused to allow the owners of
expropriated property to go through the courts in an attempt to collect
payment.118 In Chile, if an expropriation case did manage to make it
through court and the court happened to rule in favor of the case, the
Chilean government acted as if the decision had never been made.119
In all three cases, the State Department responded in some way
economically when negotiations fell through. With Mexico, they put
an import quota on Mexican oil, which nearly brought their oil
exports to a halt.120 The State Department also kept large public and
private loans from reaching Mexico.121
In Cuba, the government simply declared a general trade
embargo against them and also got rid of the island’s sugar import
quota.122 In Chile’s case, the government was not quite so harsh. They
just stopped giving Chile economic assistance and began
“withholding support from loans under consideration by multinational
financial institutions.”123 In each instance, the economic situations
helped the US get what they wanted, even though it took years to
reach a conclusion.
Author George M. Ingram writes, “There would seem to be a
flaw in a process where the U.S. Government is seldom involved in
the initiation of a foreign business activity but is always called upon
when trouble arises. [It] should develop a more precise policy toward
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U.S. foreign investment.”124 The coffee company did nothing wrong
to have their land taken away, but had the US had a more definitive
policy regarding agrarian matters, the situation might not have
dragged on as long as it did. If there had been a preset policy, then all
parties would have moved down the same path in unison and they
would all be in compliance as they completed the negotiations.
Now that we have seen that Mexico is not the only Latin
American country the United States has dealt with in regards to land
expropriation, it would make an interesting study to look at how the
State Department took action in other Latin American countries that
took up expropriating American-owned land, such as Bolivia and
Uruguay. Both of those countries also targeted American-owned land
in their agrarian reforms. To look at how the government dealt with
those reforms in Bolivia and Uruguay might give us some insight on
how the government views foreign policy in regards to foreign
investments, especially when it comes to their own investments.
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